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NOTES
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACT FOR ACCIDENTS SUSTAINED BY
EMPLOYEE ON WAY TO OR FROM WORK
The present discussion relates to the question of whether or not injuries
sustained by an employee on his way to or from work are within the
meaning of the terms "arise out of," and "in the course of" employ-
ment, as used in the workmen's compensation statutes. A majority of
the acts require the accident to "arise out of and in the course of the
employment," but in a few states the act is worded in the disjunctive,
or.,
It is difficult to lay down a single rule governing all cases, 2 but the
courts have generally recognized that an injury which occurs while an
employee is on his way to and from work and away from the em-
ployer's plant, does not "arise out of and in the course of the employ-
ment."' To be sure, there have been a number of exceptions or
glosses to the aforementioned doctrine, all of which may be classified
into three groups: (1) where the employer contracts to and does fur-
nish transportation to and from work;' (2) where the contract of em-
ployment contemplates expressly or impliedly the use of a road or other
'Liability always depends upon the express wording of the statute, Archi-
bald v. Ott, 87 S. E. 791, for while compensation laws abolished the defenses
of contributory negligence (Section 3 of the Missouri Act pronounces liability
"irrespective of negligence"), all of them, in some form, require that the injury
shall have occurred "in the course of the employment." Others require that
the injury must also "arise out of the employment." The Missouri statute con-
tains the common phrase, "arising out of and in the course of the employment."
But the statutes of a small minority of the states are worded in the disjunctive,
or. Obviously, a statute in the disjunctive imposes greater liability on the
employer, because accidents "arising out of" do not necessarily come within,
"the course of" employment, the latter provision being far more precise
Rayner v. Sleigh Furniture Co., 180 Mich. 166, 148 N. W. 665. Consequent-
ly, if the accident occurred in the course of the employment, it is not necessary
to show that it arises out of the employment, Twin Peaks Co. v. Indiana Com-
mission, 57 Utah 589; Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 62
Utah 33, 217 P. 1105. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that although
the act is intended to do benefit where the injury, under like or similar circum-
stances would not permit a recovery in an ordinary action at law, In re Madden,
222 Mass. 488, 111 N. E. 379, that does not amount to a justification for strain-
ing constructions to the point that they might amount ultimately to a type of
judicial legislation counter to the very purposes of the act. It is obvious
that the determination of the question whether an injury "arose out of and in
the course of the employment" within the meaning of the act depends upon
the facts of each case, viz., the place of the accident, the time with relation to
starting or stopping work, the conditions of employment, and the risk peculiar
to the employment itself, Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20; In re Fumiciello, 219
Mass. 488, 107 N. E. 349.
'Nesbitt v. Twin City Forge Co., 145 Minn. 286.
' De Constantin v. Public Service Comm., 75 W. Va. 32, 832 S. E. 88; In re
Sundine, 218 Mass. 1105.
'London Indemnity Co. v. District Court, 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 218;
Littler v. Fuller, 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554; Hackley Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 165 Wis. 586, 162 N. W. 921.
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way;' and (3) where the employee is subject to emergency calls," as in
the case of firemen.7
The most recent enunciation of the general rule denying liability is
found in Harris v. Henry Cheney Hammer Corporation, et al.,s decided
in May, 1927. Harris, the night watchman, while hurrying to work,
was killed by a train at a regular crossing, which most employees
customarily used, near his place of employment, a few minutes after
he should have been at work. In crossing, he might have used a
bridge about a half mile up the track. The court found that even on
the theory that he was hurrying to work in the interest of his employer,
if the accident "arose out of his employment,"9 it did not arise "in the
course of his employment" and was therefore not compensable.' 0 The
judge in rendering his decision referred to the ruling in the Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore," which the claimant had relied upon, and
rejected it, distinguishing between the wording of the New York and
Utah statutes. 2 This case will be treated presently.
The decisions in Bigelow v. St. Regis Paper Co.,"a and Corvi v.
Stiles & Reynolds Brick Company14 are more in accordance with the
spirit of the compensation statutes than the doctrine enunciated in Harris
v. Henry Cheney Hammer Corporation which was outlined above. In
the Bigelow case deceased was injured when struck by a train while on
way to dinner along a route customarily used by employees. The court
stated that going to and from dinner was an ordinary incident of the
employment, and hence compensable.' 5 A tone of liberality flavors the
Corvi decision. The facts were that the employee was injured on re-
turning from lunch while crossing railroad tracks at a point opposite
the plant. In crossing, he had used a path which shortened the route
from five to seven minutes from what it would have been had he used
an overhead bridge farther up the way. The court stated that the use of
the path, by shortening the route, added to the employee's comfort and
diminished the likelihood of his being tardy at the plant, and so bene-
fited the employer. Hence it was held a risk of the employment which
"arose out of and in the course of the employment." But this liberal
'Littlefield's Case, 136 A. 724 (Me. 1927); Domingez v. Pendoln, 46 Cal. App.
220, 188 P. 1025; Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn. 87, 101 A. 492.
SPapinaw v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 189 Mich. 441, 155 N. W. 545.
Frankfort General Insurance Co. v. Conduitt, 127 N. E. 212.
8223 N. Y. S. 738, Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division.
'Compare with English case of Watson v. Sherwood, 2 B. W. C. C. 462, where
the judge stated: "I have not found a single case where an accident befalling
the workman on his way to and from work, can be held to arise out of the
employment." Also Barbeary v. Chuggs, 8 B. W. C. C. 37.
'Matter of Lamport v. Siemons, 235 N. Y. 311, 313; 139 N. E. 278, accord.
'Cudahy Packing Company of Nebraska v. Mary Ann Parramore, 263 U. S.
418, 68 Law Ed. 369.
2 The New York statute is worded "arising out of and in the course of the
employment" while the Utah statute is worded in the disjunctive.
' 179 App. Div., 555, 166 N. Y. S. 874 ' 130 A. 674.




construction shifts the focus from the phrases "arising out of" and "in
the course of" to the term employment, by basing the decision not upon
a differentiation of the two terms, but upon a status effected when the
relationship of employer-employee was consummated. By way of ap-
proval it might be added that the recent current of authority has been
to take a broad conception of that term, 6 not as confined merely to
the nature of the work, or the particular service, but as reaching out
and embracing all of the conditions, obligations, and incidents of the
employment.
17
In many instances courts have given compensation statutes a very
rigid construction under even a disjunctive wording of the act. In
Paulanski's Case,'8 a Maine tribunal flatly denied compensation to an
employee injured on the way to work. In the practically unsupported
holding in Jotieb v. Village of Chisholm,'9 the same ruling was invoked,
though it certainly is not within the spirit of the statute. There a team-
ster, while unhitching after driving home at noon, was kicked by
a mule, and died as a result. The injury was held not to "arise out of
or in the course of the employment." Inasmuch as the team had to be
unhitched to be fed so that it could have the strength to haul the em-
ployer's heavy loads, it would have been more reasonable to hold that
the injury at least "arose out of the employment." But the court
based its finding on the fact that the accident did not occur within the
hours of actual employment-and this despite the well settled rule that
the period of employment is not confined to the period for which wages
are paid. 0 Sedlock v. Carr Coal Mining and Manufacturing Corn-
pany2' denied compensation to an employee on his way home from
work who was injured before he left the defendant's mine.22  And
" Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431.
" In Procaccino v. E. Horton & Sons, et al., 95 Conn. 408, 111 A. 594, the
claimant's husband was at a railroad crossing on property in an industrial dis-
trict not belonging to defendant. The court in awarding compensation deemed
that deceased met the injury within the "course of his employment" because
the private property was within the zone of employment, and all the dangers and
perils incident to the use of this method of approach were perils incident to and
arising out of the course of employment, See Merlino v. Connecticut Quar-
ries, 93 Conn. 57, 104 A. 396. In re Sundine, supra, note 3, is enlightening.
The claimant, Miss Sundine, was injured while upon stairs over which her em-
ployer had no right of control. The holding was, that despite the fact that she
may have been a licensee or trespasser on another's property, the use of the
stairway was contemplated by her employment. Yet by analogy a number of
rulings denying compensation to employees injured on employer's railroad sid-
ing which belong to railroad company, Harris v. Henry Cheney Hammer Cor-
poration, supra, are incompatible with this Massachusetts holding. Indisputably,
however, argument by analogy in compensation cases is well-nigh valueless,
Kitchenbaum v. Steamship Johannesburg, A. C. 417; 4 B. W. C. C. 311, for each
case must be decided on all the facts and circumstances surrounding, Paulanski's
Case, 135 A. 824 (January, 1927), which, of course, are as varied as human
experience.
Paulanski's Case, supra. '211 N. W. 579 (Minnesota).
" Larke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 97 A. 320.
"98 Kan. 680, 159 P. 9.
" This was based on a Kansas Statute (Laws of 1913) providing that: "The
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State ex rel. Miller v. District Court"3 refused an award to a messenger
boy who had climbed on a truck in returning to the office from a short
trip for which car fare had not been furnished to him, holding that
the injury did not even "arise out of the employment." However, the
more recent decisions savor of liberality of construction and view, with-
out going to extremes. 2
4
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, illustrates a more liberal
construction of the disjunctively worded statute. The facts of this
case are analagous to those in the Harris v. Henry Cheney Hammer
Corporation, supra, and though it was decided under a different statute,
the holding was not based so much on the particular disjunctive wording
of the Utah Act, as on the spirit of the workmen's compensation act.
In the Cudahy case, an employee was killed on way to work at a rail-
road crossing on a public highway, which furnished the sole means of
access to the plant. Compensation was granted on a finding of peculiar
abnormal exposure, and the award was upheld by both the Utah
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States. This de-
cision has been the subject of extended comment and criticism21 in
other compensation awards. However, it seems to be well founded in
both reasoning and experience as well as in a sensible interpretation of
the intention of the legislature in passing such an act. There is no
question but what the law authorizes or permits a recovery for an injury
to an employee going to or from work over private property under
particular circumstances or surroundings. 28 Accordingly, there does
not seem to be any logical reason why such liability should not exist in
favor of a workman going to or returning from work over a public
road under similar circumstances or surroundings.27  Why should the
employee's benefits rest upon the employer's property holdings? If lia-
bility does exist, it rests not on property rights, but because dangerous
approaches are the only means of practical ingress or egress. More-
over, liability under these circumstances does not depend upon a dif-
ferentiation of the terms, "arising out of" and "in the course of," but
is founded upon the inferrable fact that the danger incident to crossing
this railroad track was the result of a status28 which the terms of em-
ployment effected. Courts must not lose sight of the fact that such a
type of social legislation, for it certainly may be classified as such, rests
upon an idea of status, upon a conception that the injured workman is
entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of an
words arising out of an in the course of employment as used in this act shall
not be construed to include injuries to the employee occurring while he is on
his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties,
the proximate cause of which injury is not the employer's negligence."
" 138 Minn. 326.
Mayor etc., of Jersey City v. Borst, 90 N. J. Law 454, 101 A. 1033.
Harris v. Henry Cheney Hammer Corporation, supra.
' Sedlock v. Carr Coal Mining Company, supra.
' See Procaccino v. E. Horton & Sons, supra.
'Justice Sutherland states this in part in the Cudahy decision.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/8
NOTES
industry to whose operation he contributes his work as the owner con-
tributes his capital. Upon analysis, it may be seen that this idea of
status is a perfectly sensible one, for if an accident is caused merely by
a normal risk, say a use of the public highway similar to the use of the
general public, it even does not "arise out of" the employment.29 But
where an employment makes a risk of crossing tracks several times daily
imperative, it necessarily results in an exposure in excess of the com-
mon risk.'0 For this reason it seems logical to conclude that such an
accident should be compensable, since the very course of the employ-
ment required an abnormal exposure, which, if not for the status of
employment would not have existed.
So much for the general rule."- As to the exceptions enumerated in
the beginning of this note, all are well-defined and comparatively well-
settled. The first exception is that the employer is liable for injuries
sustained on way to and from work, if he contracts to and does fur-
nish transportation on way to and from work. Fisher v. Tidewater32
is exemplary. Fisher, after quitting work, went to board a train to go
to a certain ferry station on his way home. While attempting to board
the shuttle car, provided for the employees by the employer, he was
struck by a train of another railroad and killed. The method of fur-
nishing such transportation was for the company to give tickets which
were surrendered to the conductor as fare. It was held that the acci-
dent "arose out of and in the course of the employment." Here the
injury did not happen while the employee was being transported, but
while he was on his way to be transported. Apparently, however, this
is a difference without a legal distinction." A similar conclusion was
reached in Donovan's Case," one of the leading decisions, where one
was employed cleaning out catch basins two miles from his home, and
"Boyd, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, No. 486; Harper, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION, No. 34; and Bradbury, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2nd ed) p. 404.
"English cases instructive on this aspect are Pierce v. Provident Clothing
and Supply Company, (1911) 1 K. B. 997, 27 Times L. R. 299; Martin v. J.
Lovibond & Sons, (1914) 2 K. B. 227, 6 B. R. C. 466; Andrew v. Tailsworth
Industrial Society, (1904) 2 K. B. 32; 20 Times L. R. 429.
MCudahy v. Parramore, supra.
114 A. 150.
The court in Harrison v. Central Construction Corporation, supra, said:
"When the injury occurs before the beginning or after the termination of work
there are two general rules applicable to the question as to whether it arose out
of and in the course of the employment. The first is that an employee while
on his way to work is not in the course of his employment. The second is that
where the workman is employed to work at a certain place, and as a part of his
contract of employment there is an agreement that his employer shall furnish
him free transportation to and from work, the period of service continues dur-
ing the time of transportation, and if an injury occurs during the course of
transportation, it is held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employ-
ment." Accord: Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn. 87, 101 A. 492; Holmes v. Great
Northern Railroad Company, 2 Q. B. 409, 16 Times L. R. 412; Litter v. Geo. A.
Fuller Company, 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554; Cremins v. Guest, 24 Times L. R.
189, 1 B. W. C. C. 160; Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, 165 Wis. 586. "44 N. Y. S. 1115.
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was injured while riding home, after his day's work in a wagon fur-
nished by the employer to take employees to the barn if they wished to
ride, it was held that a finding was justified that the injury arose out
and in consequence of his employment. And in State ex rel. London
& L. Indemnity Company v. District Court,"5 where it appeared that a
salesman was injured while returning home from a business trip in an
automobile furnished him by the company, it was held that a finding
was justified that the injury occurred in the course of the employ-
ment .3  The benefits of the workmen's compensation act were denied
in Greeley Norwood v. Telbio River Lumber Company},' although the
employee was on his employer's logging train, the basis of the holding
being that the accident took place on a Sunday, a time when the em-
ployee owed no duty to his employer. But the foundation of the ex-
ception is nevertheless unaltered.
Fox v. Reee?8 illustrates the second exception 9 whereby the employer
is bound to compensate if the contract of employment contemplates
expressly or impliedly the use of a road or other way. The employee
of a contractor doing work in an out-of-the-way place was struck by
a train while walking to work along a railway which led to the plant
and which was the usual way of reaching it. The court found that
the employment involved the reasonable means, which the employee had
adopted with the employer's sanction, of getting from the boundary of
that which must, in substance, be treated as the employer's land, to the
actual spot on that land where he did work. Here again the court in
finding that the accident "arose out of and in the course of" the em-
ployment had to take refuge with a liberal interpretation growing out
of the status of employment, overlooking the conjunctive phrase which
has been the sore-spot for compensation decisions. There are a num-
ber of American decisions in accord. Outstanding among them are
Judson Manufacturing Company v. Industrial Accident Commission,40
Fumiciello's Case,4 1 and Schweiss v. Industrial Accident Commission.
4 2
3, 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 218.
' The American Coal Mining Company v. Crenshaw (Ind. A.), 133 N. E. 394,
granting benefits to employees injured on way home, is more of a mooted case.
The mining company entered into a contract with the railroad company by which
the latter undertook as a private carrier to transport employees of the mining
company between the mine and a certain place. Then it withheld a stated sum
per month from the salary of employees who used the railroad. The fact that
each employee paid the railroad company for each passage deserves legal con-
sideration. In fact, if the court had decided the other way on this basis, it
would have had strong grounds to stand on.
' 146 Tenn. 682, 244 S. W. 490.
' 115 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 358 practically overrules the old rule in Holmess
v. Mackay (1899), 2 Q. B. 319.
' Hannold in his work on WORMKEN'S COMPENSATION, Vol. I, No. 122, p. 453,
states: "Where the injury has arisen through the workmen using special modes
of access provided by their employers to enable them to go to or come from
the actual place of employment, the courts have uniformly held that it arose out
of the employment." ' 181 Cal. 300, 184 P. 1.
'219 Mass. 488, 107 N. E. 349. This case explains the operation of the ex-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/8
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The last exception to the general rule was invoked by a Michigan
court in Papinaw v. Grand Trunk Railroad Company,43 in a finding
that an injury to a section foreman whose duties required him to be
"on call" at night at his home, and en stormy nights to keep certain
switches clear, "arose out of and in the course of the employment."
The injury occurred when the deceased left home on a stormy evening
to get out some reports which the fact of the storm necessitated.
"Under the circumstances," said the court, "he was performing a duty
in the line of his employment out of and in the course of which the
accident which caused his death befell him."' 44  St. L., A. & T. Ry. Co.
v. Welch, 45 went still further and awarded compensation to an employee,
not actually at work but at rest in a car on a siding, holding that an
employee is always on duty and within the course of his employment
if he is required to be at a certain place "on call" and ready for work-
so long as he is at that place.
46
In regard to the right of municipal firemen and policemen to recover
under the workmen's compensation acts, there are two lines of holdings,
but they depend upon the meaning of the words, "workmen," "em-
ployees," and "laborers," within the various acts.4 7  If the fireman or
policeman is held to be an officer of the city, and not an employee there-
of, he cannot recover. 48  Most tribunals hold that the compensation
statutes are not intended to apply to disciplined, trained individuals such
as are supposed to comprise the police and fire departments, but to
employees of private corporations or persons, the latter group in con-
templation of law being laborers in the lexical sense.49  In McCarl v.
Houston,5 0 a policeman was held to be an employee and a municipal
corporation his employer, because the act included inter alia municipal
corporations. This differentiation seems to be more logical and practi-
cal, that is, a differentiation on the basis of nature of employer rather
than on the comparative skill of the employee.
ception under discussion, explaining why it could not operate on the peculiar
facts at hand.
"292 II. 90, 126 N. E. 566. In this case the claimant was permitted to show
that the employee was using the way he had been accustomed to use for five
years, which was also used by other employees, and that the employer made no
objection to this mode of access. He also was entitled to show that there was
no other convenient mode of access.
' 189 Mich. 441, 155 N. W. 545.
"The court further stated that the accident occurred while he was doing that
which a .man so employed can reasonably do, and ought to do and was injured
at a place on his employer's premises where his combined duties made it reason-
able that he should be. '72 Tex. 298, 10 S. W. 529.
" In Porritt v. Detroit United Railroad Company, 199 Mich. 200, 165 N. W.
674, an injury to a fence-builder on way to work while answering employer's
emergency call was held to arise "out of and in the course of" the employment.
Devaney's Case, 223 Mass. 270, 111 N. E. 788.
McDonald v. New Haven, 109 A. 176.
"In Griswold v. Wichita, 99 Kan. 502, 162 P. 576, an amendment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, extending its application to "county and munic-
ipal work," was held not to extend to a police captain.
. 263 P. 1.
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The three exceptions above referred to, it should be noted, apply only
to the conjunctive wording of the act, the reason being that the more
inclusive scope of the disjunctive term would ipso facto include these
exceptional situations in one of the component phrases. But an analysis
of decisions based on the conjunctive wording of the statute shows a
conscious effort on the part of tribunals to exclude as a contributing
proximate cause injuries which cannot be fairly traced to the employ-
ment.6 1 This is based on the theory that causative dangers entitling
compensation should be peculiar to the specific employment, and not
common to the entire neighborhood. As the court said in Lena Kraft
v. West Hotel Co.,52 "The danger must be incidental to the character of
the employment, and not wholly independent of the relation of master
and servant."
The fact that a person, in going to work, is compelled to use the
streets in a certain dangerous district where accidents are more likely
to occur does not justify an exception to the general rule, nor does the
fact that if it were not for the location of employer's plant, the servant
would not use this particular "risk-street" in going to and from work.
The holding in Brown v. Decatur53 is directly in point: "The cause of
the injury must be a risk or exposure incidental to the employment and
not common to the general public, regardless of the nature of the fact
of employment; or, the risk being common to the general public, the
employee must have been exposed to it in a greater degree than other
persons by reason of his employment."' 4  To make the argument more
persuasive, it is not enough for the injured servant to say: "The acci-
dent would not have happened if I had not been engaged in that employ-
ment, and if I had not been in that particular place." He must go
further and say, "The accident arose because of something I was doing
in the course of my employment, or because I was exposed, by the
nature of my employment, to some peculiar danger."
Generally, the relation of master and servant may extend beyond the
hours of the servant's actual labor, and even to places other than the
premises on which he is employed. Thus recovery is not precluded by
the fact that the employee actually was not on the premises proper ;66
tho the protection of the law does not extend, except by special con-
tract, beyond the locality or vicinity of the place of labor 6 And the
'De Constantin v. Public Service Commission, supra.
193 Ia., 1288.
'188 Ill. A. 147; Accord: Zabriskie v. Erie Railroad Company, 86 N. J. L.
266.
"Accord: Union S. Mf'g. Company v. Davis, 64 Ind. App. 227.
'Munn v. State Industrial Board, 24 Ill., 70, 113 N. E. 110.
"Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 27; 148 N. W. 243. This decision considered a
claim of compensation for one Hill, a track worker, who was killed on the way
home to eat dinner, wl~le walking on his employer's tracks at a point con-
siderably distant from where he left his section gang. The Michigan court, in
denying compensation said in part: "One of the tests sometimes applied is
whether the workman is still on the premises of his employer. This, while
often a helpful consideration, is by no means conclusive. A workman might be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/8
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period of employment is not confined to the period for which wages are
paid; for courts have not refused compensation without justifying the
holding on some other ground as well.5 7
In conclusion it might be said that an injury incurred by a workman
in the course of his travel to his place of work (and not yet on the
premises of the employer) does not give him a right to participate in
the compensation fund, unless the place of injury was in some way
brought within the scope of employment by either an express or implied
requirement in the contract of employment, or unless it appears that
the injury would not have occurred if not for the employer-employee
relationship.
ABRAHAm E. MARGOLIN, '29.
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONTRAcTs-AcCEPTANcE-NEESSITY FOR KNOWLEDGE OF OFFER OF REWARD.-
The plaintiff seeks to recover a reward offered by the Arkansas Bankers'
Association for the arrest and conviction of any person burglarizing or attempt-
ing to burglarize by forcible and violent breaking and entering any member
bank of the association. The plaintiff has complied with the terms of the offer
in so far as he has apprehended the thief and brought about his conviction, but
he admits he had no knowledge of the reward at the time of the arrest and that
his motives were not actuated by the offer. Held, that without knowledge of
the offer the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Arkansas Bankers' Associa-
tion v. Lignon, 295 S. W. 4. (Ark., 1927.)
Although the decisions on this subject are in hopeless conflict the case seems
to be supported by both the weight of authority and reason. The liability for
a reward of this kind must be created, if at all, by contract (Broadnax v. Led-
better, 100 Tex. 375, 91 S. W. 1111). Being a contractual liability it can only
arise when there is a complete contract, a meeting of minds; and a contract of
this species cannot be said to be complete unless there is both an offer and an
acceptance thereof, either express or implied. (23 R. C. L. 1117). Therefore
it would seem that the better rule is expressed in those cases holding that full
knowledge of a reward and an intention to claim it at the time of performance
of the specified services are essential to the right to recover the same. See
Morrell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544; Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476; Wilson v.
Stump, 103 Cal. 255, 37 Pac. 151; Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn. 96; E lkins v. Wyan-
dotte County, 86 Kan. 305; Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 180 Pac. 213; Ensminger
v. Horn, 70 Ill. App. 605; Williams v. W. Chicago St. Ry., 191 Ill. 610, 61 N. E.
456; Fidelity Co. v. Messer, 112 Miss. 267, 72 So. 1004; Smith v. Vernon, 188
Mo. 501; Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604; Fitch v. Snedacker, 38 N. Y. 248;
on the premises of another than his employer, or in a public place, and yet be so
close to the scene of his labor, within its zone, environment, and hazards, as to
be in effect at the place, and under the protection of the act, which, on the other
hand, as in case of a railway stretching endless miles across the country, he
might be on the premises of his employer, and yet far removed from where his
contract of labor called for."
" Larke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, supra. De Mann
v. Hydraulic Engineering Company, 159 N. W. 380.
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